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ABSTRACT
In her very interesting paper, “Peter Singer on Expendability,” L. A. 
Kemmerer re-examines Peter Singer’s utilitarian argument implying 
that some being are replaceable and the implications of this argument 
for the issue of treating animals. I attempt to defend Singer, and more 
generally utilitarianism (including the principle of replaceability), 
against these objections. I argue that, given a utilitarian outlook, some 
animals are indeed replaceable. But I also argue that few animals are 
replaceable in practice.
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Introduction
In her very interesting paper, “Peter Singer on Expendabil-
ity,” L. A. Kemmerer re-examines Peter Singer’s utilitarian 
argument implying that some beings are replaceable and the 
implications of this argument for the issue of treating animals 
(Kemmerer 2007). She argues that: 
Singer’s replaceability argument is flawed because 
he categorizes lives which are both happy and sad as 
singularly happy. His acceptance of painless death is 
problematic because Singer, a preference utilitarian, 
ignores the preference of almost every living being to 
maintain existence. Finally, Singer’s replaceability ar-
gument does not take into account the effect of killing 
on the one killed, or on their larger community (2007, 
9).
I will attempt here to defend Singer, and more generally util-
itarianism (including the principle of replaceability), against 
these objections. I will argue that, given a utilitarian outlook, 
some animals are indeed replaceable or, as Kemmerer claims, 
expendable, at least in principle. But I will also argue that few 
animals are replaceable in practice. 
Utilitarianism and the “Total” Versus 
“Prior Existence” Views
To put things very broadly, utilitarian theory requires us to 
bring about the best balance of utility. On this view, an action 
(or a practice or a policy) is morally right just in case it maxi-
mizes utility or intrinsic value or, as contemporary utilitarians 
sometimes say, the best balance of benefits and harms. That is, 
on this view, the right action must be such that there is no alter-
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native to it that would bring about a better balance of intrinsic 
value. 
Now, this general utilitarian idea requires several qualifica-
tions. In particular, it needs to be supplemented with some ac-
count of what counts as an intrinsic value and what kinds of 
things are intrinsically good and bad. Sometimes Singer writes 
as if he were leaning toward a version of hedonism. For ex-
ample, he maintains that, from a moral point of view, no suf-
fering of any sentient being can be simply ignored. On other 
occasions, however, he seems to lean toward a preference satis-
faction theory of intrinsic value. On this view, it is good when 
someone’s rational preferences and desires are fulfilled and it is 
bad when they are thwarted. There are, of course, close connec-
tions between sentience (understood as ability to feel pain and 
pleasure) and what is in someone’s interests. As Singer puts it 
in his seminal Animal Liberation:
The capacity for suffering and enjoyment is a prerequi-
site for having interests at all, a condition that must be 
satisfied before we can speak of interests in a meaning-
ful way. It would be nonsense to say that it was not in 
the interest of a stone to be kicked along the road by a 
schoolboy. A stone does not have interests because it 
cannot suffer. Nothing that we can do to it could pos-
sibly make any difference to its welfare. The capacity 
for suffering and enjoyment is, however, not only nec-
essary, but also sufficient for us to say that a being has 
interests—at an absolute minimum, an interest in not 
suffering. A mouse, for example, does have an interest 
in not being kicked along the road, because it will suf-
fer if it is (1990, 7-8).
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In this paper, we will put to one side a debate between vari-
ous accounts of intrinsic value, and relative merits of hedonism 
versus the interests (and preferences) satisfaction theories. It 
is important to notice, however, that both views seem to have 
similar implications with regard to the issue of the value of life. 
In particular, Singer does not think that life per se (that is, sim-
ply being alive) is intrinsically good. Rather, from his point of 
view, being alive is good only in so far as it allows some being 
to exemplify states of affairs that are intrinsically good or bad, 
i.e., feeling pleasure or pain, fulfillment or frustration of one’s 
desires and preferences, and so on. 
This aspect of Singer’s theory seems to lead him to some dif-
ficulties. For it seems to imply that,  as long as the total balance 
of utility remains the same, it is all right to kill someone and 
replace this being with someone else who exemplifies similar 
values. To see how these difficulties arise, it will help to distin-
guish two different interpretations of the utilitarian principle, 
namely, what may be called the “total” version of utilitarianism 
and the so-called “prior existence” view. 
Singer characterizes the “total” view as requiring us to in-
crease the total balance of utility “irrespective of whether this 
is done by increasing the pleasure of existing beings, or in-
creasing the number of beings who exist” (Singer 1979, 147). 
In contrast, the “prior existence” view considers the pleasures 
and pains only of beings that already exist (147). (Again, let us 
remind ourselves that this way of introducing the “total” and 
the “prior existence” views puts emphasis on utility being de-
pendent on pleasure and pain. As we have noticed earlier, ulti-
mately Singer seems to lean toward the preference-satisfaction 
theory of intrinsic value rather than toward hedonism.) 
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Kemmerer correctly recognizes that, because of some al-
leged internal problems with the “prior existence” view, Singer 
accepts the “total” view. To bring these problems into sharper 
focus, let us start with the question whether the possible plea-
sure of a non-existing child (i.e., a merely possible child) is a 
reason to bring him into existence. Singer observes that, gen-
erally, the pain felt by such a potential child is a reason not 
to bring this child into existence. For example, a woman who 
knows that her potential child would be extremely unhappy has 
a good reason not to become pregnant. If we accept, however, 
that a potential suffering is a reason not to bring this being into 
existence, then as a matter of symmetry, it seems that the po-
tential pleasure felt by this child would be a reason to bring this 
being into existence.
Singer reaches a similar conclusion by means of a slightly 
different argument, summarized in the following passage:
[I]t does not seem wrong for the government of an un-
derpopulated country to encourage its people to have 
more children so that the population will rise by, say, 
one million. Yet of this million, we can be sure that 
at least one will be thoroughly miserable. If it is not 
wrong to create the million, but would be wrong to cre-
ate the single miserable being, the obvious explanation 
is that there is value in the creation of the 999,999—
or however many it will be—whose lives are happy 
(1979, 150).
Kemmerer thinks that Singer’s arguments stem from a mistaken 
assumption that, except for few who are undeniably miserable, 
lives are generally happy. So, their happiness outweighs the 
suffering of the unhappy ones. That is, she attributes to Singer 
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the view that, for the vast majority of humans, their existence 
is “an undisputed positive/pleasure” (Kemmerer 2007, 4). Con-
trary to this view, Kemmerer thinks that it is more reasonable 
to assign “a neutral or mixed value to life.” That is, she thinks 
that a not-yet-conceived entity “will most likely find a mixture 
of both pleasure and pain throughout life” and, furthermore, 
that “the pain ratio will be higher in the birth of an abnormal 
child—for the child, the parent, and all involved” (4). All of 
this seems well justified. This brings her to make the following 
point against Singer:
If we rewrite Singer’s conundrum, eliminating his as-
sessment of most lives as an automatic (and it would 
seem exclusive) pleasure, the question looks very dif-
ferent:  if the pleasure and pain a normal child is apt to 
experience is not a reason for bringing it into the world, 
why is the certain increased pain of a defective child 
a reason against bringing it into the world? The ques-
tion no longer appears asymmetrical or perplexing. If 
the anticipated mix of pleasure and pain is altered so 
that increased pain is expected, one might reasonably 
choose not to parent.
If we do not calculate the average life as exclusively 
“pleasure,” Singer’s reason for rejecting the “prior ex-
istence” view (an asymmetry created by a fallacious 
assumption) evaporates (Kemmerer 2007, 4).
Now, I fail to see how exactly Kemmerer’s argument is sup-
posed to go. For I fail to see why her way of  viewing life, as 
containing the mixture of both pleasure and pain, helps her to 
establish her position and her argument against Singer. Thus, I 
will argue now for two points. First, just like Kemmerer would 
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like him to do, Singer in fact assumes that lives normally con-
tain a mixture of both pleasure and pain (as opposed to assum-
ing the view attributed to him by Kemmerer, i.e., that lives con-
tain only pleasure). Second, when we recognize the fact that 
normal lives contain such mixtures, there are still very strong 
reasons to think that the “total” view is correct and the “prior 
existence” view is not. 
To begin, let us consider two cases that help Singer arrive 
at his conclusions and which are borrowed from Derek Parfit, 
who pioneered a serious inquiry into the issue of how we should 
treat merely potential (as opposed to not yet existing but nev-
ertheless actual future) people and their interests (Parfit 1976; 
1984, 367; cf. Singer 1993, 123ff). In the first example, a three 
months pregnant woman receives from her doctor a bit of bad 
news combined with a bit of good news. The bad news is that 
the fetus has a defect that will significantly diminish the future 
child’s quality of life. However, the child will not be affected 
so adversely as to make his life utterly miserable, or not worth 
living at all. The good news is that this defect is easily treatable. 
All the woman has to do is to take a pill that will have no nega-
tive side effect for her or her future children. Parfit claims, and 
Singer agrees, that the woman ought to take the pill and make 
sure that she will have a healthy child (Singer 1993, 123). It is 
important to notice now that, contrary to the view attributed to 
him by Kemmerer, Singer perceives the life of this child as con-
taining a mixture of both pleasure and pain. Furthermore, let 
us also recognize that both a handicapped child and a healthy 
one would have a life that is worth living (i.e., a life in which 
the child’s pleasure outweighs pain). Singer and Parfit agree, 
finally, that the woman should take the pill because a healthy 
child will have a better quality of life and consequently a better 
mixture of pleasure and pain. 
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The second case discussed by Singer includes a slight modi-
fication. In this case the woman visits her doctor before she be-
comes pregnant, when she is about to stop using contraception. 
She also receives a bit of bad news accompanied by a bit of good 
news. Namely, she learns that, if she conceives a child within 
the next three months, her offspring will be born with a serious 
defect. This defect would impact his life in the same way as 
the defect discussed in the previous case would affect the first 
child. Unfortunately, and here is the difference from the previ-
ous case, this defect is not treatable. That is, the woman cannot 
simply take a pill and assure that she will have a completely 
healthy child. Nevertheless, she also receives some good news. 
Namely, she learns that if she waits only three months, her fu-
ture child will not have any defect at all and thus will develop 
normally. Singer again agrees with Parfit that the woman ought 
to wait three months, i.e., until she can conceive a completely 
healthy child. He maintains that, if the first woman did not take 
a pill or if the second woman did not wait three months, each 
of them would do something wrong. Furthermore, other things 
being equal (e.g., the waiting period is not harder for the second 
woman than taking a pill is for the first), each of them would do 
something that is equally bad or wrong. But why? 
The first case can be explained in an easy way. If the woman 
does not take the pill she will allow her child to be harmed. 
More precisely, she will make her child worse off than this 
child would have been otherwise. So far, this case does not lend 
any support to either the “total” or the “prior existence” view. 
But, as Singer observes, the second case is not open to the same 
explanation. For we cannot now argue that, if the woman does 
not wait, she will make someone worse off than this very being 
would have been otherwise, i.e., if she decided to wait. The rea-
son for this is that the child does not yet exist. To see this point 
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more sharply, suppose that the child from the second example 
grows up and one day claims what follows. “You should have 
waited three months. If you waited, I would not have been born 
with this disability and my life would have been significantly 
better.” The woman could simply respond as follows:
If I had waited three months before becoming pregnant 
you would have never existed. I would have produced 
another child, from a different egg and different sperm. 
Your life, even with your disability, is definitely above 
the point at which life is so miserable that it ceases to 
be worth living. You never had a chance of existing 
without the disability. So, I have not harmed you at all 
(Singer 1993, 124).
So, what follows from this example? In this case, the wrong-
ness of not waiting three months does not consist in harming 
the actually existing child, for the actual child has life which 
is as good as it possibly can be for this very child. But, then, 
why is it wrong? One possibility is that it is wrong because the 
woman did not bring into existence the possible child she could 
have had and would have had otherwise, i.e., if she decided to 
wait three months. As Singer observes, “this option commits 
us to the total view, and implies that, other things being equal, 
it is good to bring into existence children without disabilities” 
(Singer 1993, 124). There is, however, an even more satisfac-
tory answer to our question about the wrongness of her actions; 
namely: 
the wrong-doing lies... in bringing into existence a 
child with a less satisfactory quality of life than another 
child whom one could have brought into existence. In 
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other words, we have failed to bring about the best pos-
sible outcome (Singer 1993, 124-125).
This argument implies, however, that not only the interests of 
already existing beings but also the interests of possible be-
ings matter when we make moral decisions. That is, again, this 
answer seems to commit us to the “total” view as the correct 
interpretation of utilitarianism. 
To sum up, in this section we considered Kemmerer’s objec-
tions to Singer’s version of utilitarianism. I have argued that, 
contrary to her interpretation of Singer, he assumes that typi-
cally lives include a mixture of both pleasure and pain (or other 
beneficial and harmful states). Furthermore, I have revisited 
Singer’s reasons in support of the “total” view as the correct 
interpretation of utilitarianism. These reasons seem to be con-
vincing.
From the “Total” View to Replaceability
Suppose that a certain being, X, has on balance an enjoyable 
life (i.e., a life that overall contains more pleasure than pain, or 
a positive balance of all things that contribute to the life’s be-
ing worth living). Suppose, furthermore, that we can painlessly 
kill X and replace it with another being, Y, that has an equally 
enjoyable life. If we replace X by Y, the total amount of utility 
in the world will remain constant. So, it seems, the “total” view 
implies that there is nothing wrong in killing X and replacing 
this being by Y (provided that X and Y have equally enjoyable 
lives).
Let us now take this reasoning one step further and suppose 
that X is used by a third party in a way that brings some ex-
tra pleasure to the world, and then is killed and replaced by Y. 
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Suppose that this pleasure could not have been obtained in any 
other way. Again, it would seem that the “total” view implies 
that we ought to bring X into existence, use X in the way that 
generates extra pleasure, and then kill X and replace it by Y. 
But what does it mean in practice?
Consider a case involving eating fish. Suppose that a certain 
fish, X, has an enjoyable life, is caught and killed painlessly, 
and then is replaced by another happy fish, Y. Suppose also that 
X is consumed by someone who likes to eat fish and that eat-
ing fish generates a surplus of pleasure in this person, pleasure 
he would not have eating only a vegetarian diet. It would seem 
that the “total” view implies that, other things being equal, 
there would be nothing wrong about this sort of practice. After 
all, the total amount of fish pleasures and pains remains con-
stant, while the practice creates a certain surplus of pleasure ex-
perienced by someone who likes to eat fish. So, it would seem, 
the “total” view would allow for some forms of raising animals 
for food and eating them. For it seems that, in principle, at least 
animals like our happy fish are replaceable.
Similar arguments can be made about many other animals 
and, perhaps, even some humans. This leads, however, to seri-
ous difficulties for the “total” view. For example, in one of his 
papers, Dale Jamieson considers a couple planning to have only 
a certain number of children. Suppose that one of their children 
is miserable. The “total” view seems to imply that the couple 
ought to eliminate this child and replace it with a happier one. 
After all, such an action would increase the balance of happi-
ness (Jamieson 1983, 142-145). But this result seems highly 
counterintuitive. Michael Lockwood offers another hypotheti-
cal example. He envisages a company, call it “Disposapup,” 
that breeds pups to provide pets for families. It also takes the 
Stefan Sencerz
92
© Between the Species, 2011
http://digitalcommons.calpoly.edu/bts/
Vol. 14, Issue 1
pets back in cases in which someone does not want to have a 
pet any more or, at least, does not want to have a pet for a while. 
Thus, imagine that a family wants to take a vacation and that 
they get bored with a particular dog which had outgrown its 
cuteness. In such a case, “Disposapup” will accept a return, kill 
the dog painlessly, and then (when the family is ready after its 
vacation) provide them with another similarly cute pup. Like 
Jamieson, Lockwood argues that Singer’s version of utilitarian 
theory implies that there is nothing wrong with “Disposapup” 
(Lockwood 1979, 168).  It opens doors to many similar repug-
nant implications for Singer’s version of utilitarianism.
Kemmerer claims that these sorts of results are not really 
implied by utilitarian theory per se but rather by Singer’s “to-
tal” view interpretation of utilitarianism. Because they follow 
from this view, Kemmerer finds the “total” view unacceptable. 
Unfortunately, as we have seen in the previous section, her ar-
guments against the “total” view are unconvincing. So, let us 
consider again the limits and implications of replaceability. 
The Limits of Replaceability
Let us recall the considerations offered in the first section. 
One can conceive a child now. In effect, this child will have 
some defect but, overall, this child will also have a reasonably 
happy and good life. Alternatively, one can wait few months 
and conceive a child then. In effect, this child will have no de-
fects at all and thus will have a very happy and good life. Under 
those conditions, it seems that one ought to wait. These sorts 
of considerations suggest that, at the very least, potential be-
ings are replaceable. That is, it seems that we can replace one 
possible being (i.e., the being who does not yet exist but would 
exist depending on our actions) with another possible being. 
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But can we extend this implication to already existing be-
ings? That is, are there any actual (rather than merely potential) 
beings who are also replaceable? Singer argues that self-con-
sciousness makes a difference and that self-conscious (and not 
merely conscious) beings are not replaceable. The reason for 
that is that such beings have some understanding of their fu-
ture. Hence, arguably, they also have some preferences regard-
ing their future. In particular, other things being equal, such 
beings would desire to continue their existence in the future, 
would desire not to be killed in the future, would desire to be 
free now from worries about the future, and so on. Any act of 
killing would thwart these preferences. Furthermore, it could 
also cause suffering resulting from the anticipation of the pre-
mature death. Consequently, other things being equal, it would 
be wrong to kill such a being.
The example regarding a really-miserable child, offered by 
Jamieson and discussed in the previous section, is a special 
case. This case raises special questions related to the issue of 
euthanasia. These questions are too complex to discuss fully 
here. But I would argue that, in some circumstances (e.g., when 
suffering is excruciating and cannot be alleviated, and when 
death is inevitable), euthanasia may be morally permissible. 
Under such conditions, other things being equal (e.g., putting 
to one side their own anxiety and misery as well as legal con-
siderations and possible penalties), it may be both reasonable 
and moral to terminate the life of such a child.  I do not see 
that cases of this sort raise special additional problems for the 
utilitarian theory and the “total” view. On the contrary, in such 
cases, the utilitarian theory seems to be in harmony with intui-
tive considerations. So, I will put such cases to the side. 
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A much different case would involve a child who has some 
defect yet this defect is not severe enough to make her life re-
ally miserable. I would argue that, if such a child is self-con-
scious (and not merely conscious), the considerations offered 
two paragraphs earlier would be pertinent. So, in such a case, 
the child would not be really replaceable.
This brings us to the final kind of case in which we deal with 
merely conscious and not self-conscious beings. Recall the 
company “Disposapup,” described by Michael Lockwood. Let 
us assume also that small pups are not self-conscious. Suppose 
that a family gets such a pup, keeps it for a few months, then 
discards it when the pup outgrows its cuteness, or when they 
want to go on a vacation, or when they want to have a different 
pup, or in any similar circumstances. What would be wrong 
about this sort of practice? It seems that a theory like Singer’s 
does not have resources to argue that, in principle, small pups, 
or fish, or perhaps even chickens are not per se replaceable. 
It does not follow, however, that the utilitarian theory has no 
resources to argue against this sort of practice on other grounds. 
Kemmerer herself offers several reasons for thinking that, in 
practice, what we actually do to animals has devastating results 
for us, our families, our society, and our environment. Thus, 
even if many animals are replaceable in principle (or, other 
things being equal), we may have conclusive reasons not to 
replace them in practice (for other things are not equal). Some 
of these reasons will be considered in the next section.
Are Other Things Really Equal? 
To begin, let us consider some effects of standard procedures 
in almost every animal laboratory. Educators repeatedly won-
der why prospective doctors and scientists arrive at schools 
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“sensitive, concerned, idealistic, morally aware, and infused 
with a desire to promote health and alleviate illness and suffer-
ing, yet emerge four years later cynical, hardened, brutalized, 
and rigid, their ideals and enthusiasm forgotten” (Rollin 1981, 
110).  As one observer noticed, “once you’ve been here a few 
days, you lose respect for all living things” (Orlans 1998, 132). 
The reason why it happens seems to be that human and veteri-
nary medicine requires students to perform extensive and pain-
ful experiments on animals. Kemmerer suggests that these un-
necessary and frequently cruel experiments challenge the very 
moral sensibilities of practitioners and, in effect, badly damage 
the desire and hope to heal animals and treat them with at least 
minimal level of respect.
Working in the meat industry frequently has even more dev-
astating effects. First, factory husbandry causes animals ex-
cruciating suffering. In fact, the animals in factory farms are 
so miserable that the replaceability considerations simply do 
not apply. In paradigm examples when these considerations 
are used, one happy being is replaced by another happy be-
ing while, in effect, we generate some surplus of pleasure. Yet 
animals tortured in factory farms are not happy; on the con-
trary, they are so miserable that their lives are most likely not 
worth living. Consequently, if we continue with this practice, 
we would be replacing one miserable animal with another. Be-
cause suffering of animals in factory farms is so enormous, it 
is hard to see how this way of producing meat is conducive to 
generating a good balance of utility. Consequently, it’s hard to 
see how factory farms could be defended on either the “prior 
existence” or “total” interpretation of the utilitarian theory. (An 
exception would be cases where the benefits of such a practice 
outweigh the harms caused to animals and there is no alterna-
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tive way to bring about those benefits without causing suffering 
to animals.)  
Second, using up lots of energy and producing many sub-
stances that pollute the environment, factory farms also have 
further very serious negative effects. Finally, and this is a very 
interesting part of her essay, Kemmerer brings to our attention 
additional facts concerning how the meat industry affects peo-
ple who raise animals for food (see Eisnitz 1997). It turns out 
that even officially sanctioned institutionalized killing for the 
“benefit of humanity” has serious negative effects on those who 
do the deed. One of these effects is a dramatic “hardening” of 
their moral sensibilities. For example, slaughterhouse workers 
admit to excessive and unnecessary cruelty toward the animals 
they perpetually kill. One of them reported the following:
The worst thing, worse than the physical danger, is the 
emotional toll. If you work in that stick pit for any pe-
riod of time [killing pigs], you develop an attitude that 
lets you kill things but doesn’t let you care. You may 
look a hog in the eye that’s walking around down in the 
blood pit with you and think, God, that really isn’t a 
bad-looking animal. You may want to pet it. Pigs down 
on the kill floor have come up and nuzzled me like a 
puppy. Two minutes later I had to kill them—beat them 
to death with a pipe. I can’t care...
Every sticker [slaughterhouse killer] I know carries 
a gun, and every one of them would shoot you. Most 
stickers I know have been arrested for assault. A lot of 
them have problems with alcohol. They have to drink, 
they have no other way of dealing with killing life, 
kicking animals all day long. If you stop to think about 
Stefan Sencerz
97
© Between the Species, 2011
http://digitalcommons.calpoly.edu/bts/
Vol. 14, Issue 1
it, you’re killing several thousand beings a day (Eisnitz 
1997, 87).
Eisnitz discovered also that “with nearly thirty-six injuries or 
illnesses for every one hundred workers, meat packing is the 
most dangerous industry in the United States” (271). The long 
term effect of slaughterhouse work is “a system that places 
nearly as little value on human life as it does on animal life” 
(273). Consequently, it causes numerous undesirable conse-
quences for humans. It is very likely that puppy mills, like the 
one described by Jamieson, would have similarly negative ef-
fects on people who work there. They would probably have 
further questionable implications for those who buy pets from 
such a company and then dispose of them at the slightest in-
convenience. 
To sum up, Kemmerer is correct that the utilitarian theory 
has many resources that can be used to show that, even if cer-
tain ways of using animals are not wrong per se, because they 
do not harm animals, they still may be wrong on other grounds. 
Specifically, they may be wrong because of their negative side 
effects; i.e., the consequences for us all, other animals, and our 
environment. She is probably correct in claiming that utilitar-
ians could explore more fully those aspects of their theory. All 
of this does not add up, however, to an argument that some 
merely-conscious animals are not replaceable per se. That is, I 
fail to see that Kemmerer has provided convincing reasons to 
reject the replaceability considerations.
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Utilitarianism and the Treatment of Animals  
Revisited 
It is easy to underestimate the nuances of the sophisticated 
version of utilitarian theory used by Singer. He himself points 
to some complications in the 2nd edition of his Practical Eth-
ics (as well as in other writings), and it is a bit unfortunate that 
Kemmerer has focused mostly on the first edition of his book. 
Singer observes, in particular, that one significant change be-
tween these two editions includes the distinction between two 
levels of moral reasoning that he adopted from Oxford philoso-
pher R.M. Hare; namely, the distinction between the everyday 
intuitive level and the more reflective, critical level (Singer 
1993, X; cf. Hare 1976, 1981). 
The intuitive level of moral reasoning includes our everyday, 
common-sense morality. This level includes our moral disposi-
tions, attitudes, emotions, and general rules that we apply in 
most of our ordinary circumstances. R.M. Hare brought to our 
attention several constraints that such rules must satisfy. As 
he noticed, we use these intuitive rules when we do not have 
enough time for critical thinking, or when there are other rea-
sons not to trust our critical skills. To use one example, ordi-
nary people tend to be biased towards their own interests and 
the interests of their loved ones; e.g., parents making decisions 
about organ transplants tend to overestimate benefits for their 
children and also tend to favor the interests of their children in 
comparison with the interests of other children. So, if they were 
to make their moral decisions solely on the principle of utility, 
very likely they might overestimate the value of their actions 
for them and their loved ones, and underestimate the value of 
their actions for others. Consequently, they likely might make 
unfair decisions. To counteract this potential bias, it may be 
safer to act on more simple intuitive rules requiring that all 
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humans ought to be treated equally and that people who have 
conflicts of interests should recuse themselves from making the 
final decisions. In addition, we tend to show weakness of will 
(i.e., we do not always do what we think is right). For this rea-
son, it seems as if very complex rules allowing for multiple 
exceptions would be hard to internalize and follow. Thus, intui-
tive rules need to be relatively simple and easy to internalize 
and apply. Furthermore, our knowledge is limited and we do 
not have indefinite time to make our moral decisions. Again, 
this provides a reason for not using solely the principle of util-
ity and adopting instead relatively simple and easy to follow 
rules. 
How do we decide, however, which intuitive rules are the 
correct ones? We do it at the critical level which assumes that 
an agent has perfect knowledge, is not a victim of weakness of 
will, is not biased towards his or her own interests, has enough 
time to think about all relevant matters, and so on. Thus, the 
critical level has several functions. First, we use it when we 
decide how to design our intuitive-level rules. Second, we use 
it when we discover that those principles are in conflict, so we 
need to adjudicate between them. (For example, we encoun-
ter an example analogous to Kant’s case of an innocent person 
chased by bandits and we realize that we cannot save his life 
without lying. So, we realize we must break one of the intuitive 
rules and the only relevant question is which rule to break.) 
Third, we use it when we encounter an unusual case for which 
those rules are not designed. Finally, we use it when it’s clear 
beyond a reasonable doubt that there are conclusive reasons to 
depart from intuitive-level rules. (In addition to two levels of 
normative thinking, Hare proposes also a meta level that allows 
us to define moral concepts, develop ways of arguing about 
normative issues, and so on.)
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According to Hare, at the critical level but only at that level, 
we ought to use straightforward utilitarian considerations and 
base our reasoning on the idea of bringing about the best pos-
sible balance of utility.  It is rather clear that the question—
“what kinds of beings are per se replaceable?”—would be ad-
dressed at the level of critical thinking. It seems that we have 
reasons to think that self-conscious beings are not replaceable 
even in principle. But we also have some utilitarian reasons to 
think that, other things being equal, merely conscious beings 
are probably replaceable.
Our job is not finished, however, once these sorts of ques-
tions are answered. We still need to address issues about how 
to apply these considerations in practice or what kinds of rules 
we should develop and follow at the intuitive level of thinking. 
Now we have to take into account the fact that these rules must 
be reasonably simple and easy to internalize and follow; they 
must counterbalance our bias, prevent the development of bad 
habits, and so on. Taking all of this into account, it seems that 
we should assume that, even if some animals are replaceable 
in principle, many of them are not replaceable in practice. In 
particular, it seems that, in practice, a company of disposable 
puppies would not be a good means to bring about a good bal-
ance of utility. Let us restate some of the reasons why. 
As is stipulated by Jamieson, the employees of this company 
would be required to kill undesirable pups. If this is the case, 
however, they would be under the same kinds of pressures as 
the current workers in animal husbandry. We have already seen 
how devastating this work is for their moral sensibilities. They 
are frequently cruel not only to animals but also to humans. In 
fact, most of them have serious problems with guns, drugs, and 
alcohol and many are arrested for assaults. In addition, suppose 
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that we accept for our society a rule that there is nothing wrong 
about treating a young pup as if he were a mechanical toy not 
able to feel anything. Specifically, suppose we accept that there 
is nothing wrong about killing him or her for a mere matter 
of convenience. Imagine now that young people internalize 
this rule and start applying it to their own pups. Very likely we 
would create generations of people who have badly damaged 
their characters and, in effect, are willing to treat in the same 
way not only young (that is, merely conscious) pups but also 
adult dogs, other animals, and perhaps even fellow human be-
ings. Now, arguably, adult mammals are not merely conscious 
but also self-conscious (even if this is only a rudimentary self-
consciousness). Thus, if our considerations from the earlier 
sections are correct, they are not replaceable even in principle. 
Similarly, except for very small children and people who are 
very severely mentally handicapped, human beings are self-
conscious and hence not replaceable. Thus, a rule allowing us 
to treat young pups as replaceable would very likely lead gen-
erations of people to abuse animals and perhaps even humans. 
To wit, a rule allowing for treating pups as replaceable does not 
seem conducive to producing desirable social utility. We have 
good consequentialist reasons to reject such a rule. 
There are further consequentialist reasons against the prac-
tice of disposing of pups for the reason of mere convenience. 
This practice would be conducive to generating good conse-
quences only if the owners have a very detached attitude to 
their pets. A more loving attitude would lead them to miss their 
animals when they are gone, which would count as suffering 
or disutility. It seems, however, that a detached attitude to pets, 
including treating them as if they were literally disposable me-
chanical toys, is not conducive to the well-being of either pets 
or their owners. To explain why, I am going to rely on my own 
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example. Some 5 years ago I went to a local animal shelter and 
adopted my first dog; several months later she “adopted,” with 
my consent, her playmate, also a rescue. Since then, my life has 
changed in many quite unexpected ways. 
To start with some seeming negatives, our interactions have 
not been free from some sacrifice on my part. For example, my 
travels are now less easy than they used to be. Also, I pay their 
sometimes quite significant veterinarian bills. Furthermore, 
taking care of my dogs has forced me to totally change my 
lifestyle. I used to work late into the night and stay in bed until 
late in the morning. Now, I go to bed early and wake up way 
before dawn. Initially, those changes were painful to me, pain-
ful enough to doubt whether I would be able to accept them if 
I cared little for my dogs. But motivated by what is good for 
them, I have adjusted. In turn, our interactions have changed 
my life in many positive ways. For one thing, I have learned 
more discipline. In particular, we start almost every day with 
a long roam through a natural environment (we live close to 
several parks and bodies of water).  Next, I have lost some 70 
or 80 pounds and dramatically increased the level of my health 
and well-being. Finally, my dogs have given me many joys and 
pleasures that are incomparable with anything I have previ-
ously experienced in my interactions with other animals and 
nature. To put things simply, from a purely self-interested point 
of view, adopting my dogs was one of the best decisions of my 
entire life. But this decision is not only very good for me, it is 
also very good for my rescued dogs which are as happy as any 
other dogs I have known.
There is a very important factor involved in this story which 
it is good to emphasize now. Namely, I would not have devel-
oped my new habits, leading to the improvement of my weight, 
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health, and the level of my well-being, if I had treated my dogs 
as if they were mere disposable mechanical devices. That is, 
one essential factor in our relationship is that it is based on 
love and respect, as opposed to treating my animals as mere 
expendable things that can be replaced as a matter of mere con-
venience. This crucial element is exactly what has led to overall 
good consequences both for me and them. Precisely because 
of this factor, I am not willing to treat my pups as if they are 
replaceable. In fact, I would not be willing to treat them as such 
even if, as a matter of principle, they were replaceable. The up-
shot of this discussion is this. Our loving relations with animals 
seem more conducive to generating a good balance of utility 
than relations in which we are more detached and treat them as 
if they were mechanical toys. But once we establish this sort 
of relation, it is unlikely that replacing the loved animal would 
be as neutral for our well-being as Jamieson “Disposapup” 
example suggests. On the contrary, the practice of replacing 
animals would cause us lots of suffering. Again, we find strong 
consequentialist reasons to think that even small pups are not 
replaceable in practice (even if they can, perhaps, be replace-
able in principle).  
Are there, however, any animals that are replaceable even at 
the level of intuitive thinking? I would argue that a reasonably 
clear line of demarcation could perhaps be drawn at the level 
of fish and other aquatic life. Animals such as shrimps or mol-
lusks or fish have both very simple mental lives and are eas-
ily distinguishable from mammals and birds. There are many 
people who, rather than practicing pure vegetarianism, eat fish 
and seafood or even gain pleasure from the practice of catching 
fish. These people do not develop bad habits like those who 
work in the meat industry and do not end up abusing birds, 
mammals, and humans. On the contrary, many of them stick 
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with their pesco-vegetarian diet and are as respectful of other 
forms of life as they should be. 
Conclusion
To sum up, in this paper I have attempted to address several 
aspects of utilitarian theory. I have argued that there are con-
vincing reasons to accept the “total” interpretation of this view. 
I argued, next, that utilitarianism implies that merely conscious 
beings, but not self-conscious beings, are replaceable in prin-
ciple. On these two issues I disagree with Kemmerer. I have 
argued, furthermore, that she has offered many convincing 
reasons to think that, even if some animals are replaceable in 
principle, at least from a utilitarian point of view, we should not 
conclude that they are also replaceable in practice. The reason 
for this is that, because of various side effects, adopting a rule 
allowing for replacing them would have an undesirable long 
run utility. I have suggested, finally, that a reasonably clear de-
marcation line, allowing to treat some beings as replaceable, 
can perhaps be drawn at the level of organisms that are cur-
rently classified as so-called seafood.
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